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Although anecdotal evidence suggests that externally informed approaches are increasingly used in target-
setting practices, only limited evidence in the literature addresses what types of external information 
sources are used in target setting. We examine how externally informed performance expectations, such 
as analysts’ annual earnings forecasts, influence target setting for executive bonus contracts. Using 
performance target data from S&P 1500 firms, we find that analyst earnings forecasts are positively 
associated with firms’ bonus target revisions and that target accuracy improves with the incorporation of 
analyst forecasts into target setting. Furthermore, we find that the use of analyst forecasts in target setting 
is more pronounced when the forecasts are more informative about future firm performance and when 
they are less likely to be influenced by managers. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.  
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Performance targets are a key component of firms’ management control and compensation systems, 
because how firms set targets and revise them over time affects executives’ incentives (Indjejikian and 
Nanda 2002). To optimally motivate a firm’s executives, their performance targets should reflect the best 
estimate of expected performance that can be achieved with adequate levels of effort (Van der Stede 2000). 
Firms rely on various sources of information when setting and revising targets because information 
asymmetry between firms and managers makes it difficult for firms to set accurate targets (Indjejikian and 
Nanda 2002, Indjejikian et al. 2014b, Bouwens and Kroos 2017).  
Research on target setting shows that past performance is an important source of information used 
to set targets. Firms typically revise targets upward following favorable performance and downward 
following unfavorable performance; this practice is called “target ratcheting” (Weitzman 1980). The 
literature notes that the use of past performance in target setting introduces a dynamic incentive problem 
known as the “ratchet effect,” because target ratcheting motivates managers to withhold effort in the current 
period to avoid higher targets in the future (Leone and Rock 2002, Bouwens and Kroos 2011).  
Because the use of past performance in target setting introduces complex incentive effects and its 
ability to predict future performance is limited, past performance is usually complemented by other sources 
of information (Indjejikian et al. 2014b). However, the academic literature on target setting provides only 
limited evidence on the use of these other sources of information. Using data from a retail travel company, 
Aranda et al. (2014) provide evidence that firms use peer performance information in target setting. 
Bouwens and Kroos (2017) show that firms incorporate non-financial information, such as customer service, 
in target setting. Based on survey data, Dekker et al. (2012) report that internal planning information is 
widely used in target setting and that the use of internal benchmarking (i.e., the comparison of units within 
the firm) and external benchmarking (i.e., comparison between firms) is relatively limited.  
Although these findings provide insight into how firms use information sources other than past 
performance in target setting for the business units of an organization (Aranda et al. 2014, Bouwens and 
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Kroos 2017) or for middle-level managers (Dekker et al. 2012), the literature has not yet fully explored the 
use of alternative information sources in target setting for executive compensation contracts at the largest 
firms, due to a lack of publicly available data on performance targets.  
Theories and anecdotal evidence suggest that externally informed approaches can be useful in target 
setting. Using targets based on external standards that are not affected by managers can mitigate the ratchet 
effect because managers would not be able to affect next-period targets by manipulating current 
performance (Murphy 2000). In addition, external sources can provide incremental information that is not 
available from internal sources (Indjejikian et al. 2014b) and thus improve target accuracy. Recent studies 
provide empirical evidence that peer performance, one type of external standards, is used for target setting 
for divisions within a firm (Aranda et al. 2014, Bol and Lill 2015). Anecdotal evidence also supports the 
use of externally informed approaches in target setting. For example, the 2007 survey by Mercer (2009) 
indicates that 55% of participating firms use “externally informed absolute” numbers to set short-term 
incentive targets. 
In this study, we focus on the use of externally informed performance expectations to set targets for 
executive annual bonus contracts. Performance expectations by external parties provide independent and 
direct estimates of firm-specific performance, and reflect an additional information set of external parties 
that provide the estimates. External performance expectations are readily available for public firms in the 
form of analyst earnings forecasts. Thus, in the target setting of senior executives of public firms, external 
performance expectations provide useful information that is independent, informative, and less costly to 
obtain (Holmstrom 1979, Murphy 2000). 
We examine whether firms use external performance expectations to revise targets in executive 
bonus contracts by analyzing the performance target data from S&P 1500 firms, collected from the 
compensation discussion and analysis (CD&A) section of their proxy statements. We focus on earnings per 
share (EPS) targets in executive annual bonus contracts because EPS is the most widely used performance 
measure (Graham et al. 2005). As an empirical proxy for external performance expectations, we use the 
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consensus of analysts’ annual earnings forecasts that are available before the approval date of the annual 
bonus plan.  
Using a sample of 1,179 firm-year observations for fiscal years 2006 through 2014, we find a 
significant association between analyst forecasts and firms’ bonus target revisions, after controlling for past 
performance, peer performance, expected growth, the presence of management forecasts, and other control 
variables (Aranda et al. 2014, Indjejikian et al. 2014b, Kim and Shin 2017). This finding suggests that firms 
use analyst forecasts as an important external information source in revising bonus targets. Furthermore, 
using a test suggested by Bouwens and Kroos (2017), we provide evidence that incorporating analyst 
forecasts into target setting improves target accuracy.  
Next, we conduct two cross-sectional tests to examine under what circumstances the use of external 
performance expectations in target setting is more pronounced. Based on the theory that the relative weight 
on each information source in target setting depends on its informativeness about the agent’s actions and 
the extent to which the information is influenced by managers (Holmstrom 1979, Murphy 2000), we predict 
that firms place more emphasis on external performance expectations in target setting when they are more 
informative about future firm performance (Murphy 2000, Ittner et al. 2003, Bouwens and Kroos 2017) and 
when they are less likely to be influenced by managers (Murphy 2000). By using analysts’ forecast errors, 
forecast dispersion, the number of analysts following a firm, and the correlation between a firm’s 
performance and the gross domestic product (GDP) (Hutton et al. 2012) as proxies for the informativeness 
of analyst forecasts, we find that the use of analyst forecasts in target setting increases when analyst forecast 
errors are low, when forecasts are less dispersed, when the number of analysts following the firm is high, 
and when firm performance is strongly correlated with GDP. These findings support the value of external 
performance expectations that are informative about future firm performance. 
In addition, using the subsample of firms for which EPS forecasts of both affiliated analysts (i.e., 
those with an investment banking relationship with the firm) and unaffiliated analysts exist, we find that 
firms put more weight on the forecasts of unaffiliated analysts in target setting than on the forecasts of 
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affiliated analysts. We also provide evidence that the weight on analyst forecasts issued before management 
forecasts is greater than the weight on analyst forecasts issued after management forecasts. These findings 
are consistent with the notion that firms’ use of external performance expectations is more pronounced 
when they are less likely to be influenced by managers. Overall, our main findings suggest that firms’ use 
of external performance expectations in target setting varies in a manner consistent with the economic 
theory on target setting (Murphy 2000).  
 A potential alternative explanation for our main findings is that they merely reflect the effect of 
internal planning information that has been communicated to both analysts and compensation committees. 
To check this possibility, we conduct several tests using management forecasts as a proxy for internal 
planning information. The results of these tests show that our main findings hold even after controlling for 
the information in management forecasts, suggesting that they are not driven by the effect of management 
forecasts on analyst forecasts. Another potential concern is that our results may reflect that analysts revise 
their forecasts based on information about internal bonus targets (i.e., reverse causality).1 However, we find 
no evidence that analysts revise their forecasts around the approval date of the bonus plan, mitigating the 
concern about reverse causality. We also examine whether the use of analyst forecasts varies depending on 
managers’ incentives to meet or beat analysts’ expectations (i.e., equity incentives) and find no evidence 
supporting this argument. Our results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. 
We make several contributions to the literature on target setting. First, by providing large sample 
empirical evidence on the use of externally informed performance expectations in target setting, we respond 
to a call for research by Indjejikian et al. (2014b) to examine the use of externally informed performance 
targets in recent target-setting practices. We predict and find that external performance expectations, such 
as analyst forecasts, can convey information not captured by past performance and peer performance and 
                                                 
1 Our use of analyst forecasts issued before the approval date of the annual bonus plan in the empirical tests mitigates 
this concern. Furthermore, bonus plan details are not typically publicly available until proxy statements are disclosed. 
Nevertheless, managers may communicate this information to analysts before the approval date of the bonus plan (e.g., 
through management forecasts) to manage market expectations and to make it easier to beat the forecasts. We explore 
these possibilities in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
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that they are incorporated in firms’ target setting process. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that 
firms’ use of external performance expectations systematically varies as predicted by the economic theory 
on target setting (Murphy 2000). Like Bouwens and Kroos (2017), who document the use of non-financial 
information in setting financial targets, we extend previous research that has exclusively focused on past 
performance and peer information as the sources of information in target setting.  
Second, we use data on the performance targets of large U.S. public firms to shed light on how 
external information is incorporated into their target-setting processes for CEOs’ annual bonus plans. While 
a growing body of research provides evidence that various information sources, such as peer performance, 
are used to set targets for business units (Aranda et al. 2014, Bol and Lill 2015, Bouwens and Kroos 2017), 
it is still unclear whether these earlier findings hold true for the target setting of top executives of public 
firms. For example, whereas the benefit of internal benchmarking is clear for business units conducting 
homogeneous business, the value of external benchmarking is questionable due to limited data on industry 
peer performance and the subjective nature of peer group selection (Hansen et al. 2003, Dekker et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, the information set available for public firms is different from that for business units, 
suggesting that different approaches are warranted for public firms. For example, analyst forecast 
information is available only at the firm level, not at the business unit level. Based on a large cross section 
of firms, we provide new evidence on the use of external performance expectations to set targets for 
executive bonus contracts in public firms.  
Finally, we enhance the understanding of the relation between internal and external performance 
targets. Previous research has generally assumed that firms consider internal targets (for bonus 
determination) and external targets (for meeting market expectations) separately, with little interaction 
between the two.2 For example, Matsunaga and Park (2001, p. 314) argue, “The effect of missing a quarterly 
earnings benchmark on a CEO’s bonus is likely to result from the compensation committees’ exercise of 
                                                 
2 The CFOs surveyed in Graham et al. (2005) indicate that firms set higher internal targets than external targets to 
ensure that the latter are not difficult to attain. However, Armstrong et al. (2017) report that external targets exceed 
internal EPS targets in 60% of their sample.  
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their discretion in the allocation of the bonus pool, as opposed to the benchmark’s being an explicit 
component of the plan.” However, our evidence that firms update their internal bonus targets based on 
external targets suggests that firms ex ante incorporate the information about external benchmarks into an 
internal target-setting process, rather than making discretionary adjustments ex post. In a contemporaneous 
study, Armstrong et al. (2017) also examine the interaction between internal and external EPS goals as a 
source of CEO incentives. They find that external EPS goals provide CEOs with stronger incentives than 
internal EPS goals because of CEOs’ significant equity-based incentives to meet analysts’ expectations. Our 
study is different from that by Armstrong et al. (2017) in that our focus is on the target setting process, 
whereas Armstrong et al. (2017) focus on the relative incentive effects of external and internal targets on 
CEO behaviors. We consider external targets (i.e., external performance expectations) as an alternative 
source of information that can be used in setting internal targets to improve the efficiency of target setting. 
In contrast, Armstrong et al. (2017) emphasize the role of external targets in the context of meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts in the capital market. We thus believe that our study complements their findings 
in improving the understanding of the interaction between internal and external targets.     
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and sample. Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 contains additional analyses. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Performance targets serve as an important basis for business decision making, such as choosing 
investments and evaluating performance (Ittner and Larcker 2001). The goal of performance targets in 
incentive contracts is to provide managers with incentives to increase firm value while simultaneously 
compensating them competitively (Murphy 2000). Therefore, setting appropriate performance targets is 
important to optimally motivate managers. Given the information asymmetry between firms and managers, 
firms can improve their contracts by fully exploiting various sources of information to set adequate 
performance targets (Indjejikian and Nanda 2002, Indjejikian et al. 2014b, Bouwens and Kroos 2017). For 
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example, firms strive to improve the accuracy of targets, because more accurate performance standards (i.e., 
those with less deviation from actual performance) reduce managers’ compensation risk and increase their 
motivation, thereby improving the efficiency of incentive contracts (Murphy 2000). Prior research shows 
that firms can improve target accuracy by incorporating all available information when setting performance 
standards (Indjejikian and Nanda 2002, Bouwens and Kroos 2017).  
Murphy (2000) suggests that firms determine the relative weight on each source of information in 
target setting based on the three criteria: the information collection cost, the ability to predict future 
performance (i.e., accuracy or informativeness), and the extent to which managers can influence the 
information. We begin by discussing each possible source of information, such as past performance, based 
on the prior target setting literature and then develop our hypotheses on the use of external performance 
expectations in target setting based on Murphy’s (2000) theoretical framework.   
The literature identifies past performance, internal planning, and benchmarking information as 
important information sources in target setting (Dekker et al. 2012). Past performance information is widely 
used for target setting because it is readily available and informative about future performance. Target 
ratcheting occurs when firms revise targets upward following favorable performance and downward 
following unfavorable performance (Weitzman 1980). The magnitude of the target adjustment made after 
a favorable performance variance is usually greater than the target adjustment made after the same 
magnitude of an unfavorable performance variance, suggesting an asymmetry in ratcheting (Leone and 
Rock 2002, Kim and Shin 2017). Target ratcheting has negative incentive effects because managers are 
motivated to withhold their effort in the current period to avoid difficult targets in the future (i.e., the ratchet 
effect). Consistent with this argument, Bouwens and Kroos (2011) show that retail store managers with 
favorable performance in the first three quarters reduce their sales activity in the fourth quarter, suggesting 
that managers manipulate real economic activities in the current period to influence future targets.3 
                                                 
3 Firms can mitigate the ratchet effect by making a contractual commitment to disregard information about past 
performance when setting future targets (Laffont and Tirole 1993). Consistent with this argument, empirical studies 
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Past performance is typically complemented by internal planning information (e.g., firms’ business 
plans and budgets). Internal planning information is potentially more informative about future performance 
than past performance because it incorporates managers’ forward-looking information. Consistent with this 
conjecture, Dekker et al. (2012) report that internal planning information is widely used in target setting to 
complement past performance information. However, internal planning information is subject to 
manipulation and game playing because managers themselves determine it. For example, Anderson et al. 
(2010) document that when a performance-based bonus plan with participative goal setting was introduced 
in the stores of a U.S. retail firm, managers set lower goals and tended to just meet the targets. In addition, 
as internal planning information is typically used for multiple purposes, such as coordinating, planning, and 
evaluating performance, it is not clear whether this information reflects the best (unbiased) estimate of 
future performance, which is required for optimal target setting for incentive contracts.  
External information sources that are not affected by managers can be useful in target setting 
because using external information in target setting mitigates the negative incentive effect of target 
ratcheting. Managers would have no incentive to manage current performance to achieve easy future targets 
when the next-period target is determined by external standards. Consistent with this argument, Murphy 
(2000) reports that firms with externally determined performance standards (e.g., standards based on the 
performance of external peer groups, timeless standards, and standards based on the cost of capital) are less 
likely to smooth earnings than firms with internally determined standards (e.g., standards based on budgets 
or past performance).  
One type of external sources in target setting is peer performance. Information about peer 
performance can be used to assess the common components of performance across the peer group because 
                                                 
provide evidence that firms do not fully consider managers’ past performance when setting future targets (Indjejikian 
and Nanda 2002, Aranda et al. 2014, Indjejikian et al. 2014a, Bol and Lill 2015). For example, Indjejikian et al. (2014a) 
find that target revisions for well-performing managers are sensitive to past unfavorable performance variances and 
less sensitive to past favorable performance variances, suggesting that firms reward well-performing managers with 
rents. While these findings are consistent with the benefit of a long-term contractual commitment in addressing the 
ratchet effect, the commitment to disregarding information about past performance increases the demand for other 




the groups is subject to common shocks. Using data from a retail travel company, Aranda et al. (2014) find 
that supervisors use information about the relative performance of comparable branches in target setting. 
Bol and Lill (2015) show that the performance of business units relative to their peers affects the degree of 
target ratcheting. Although these studies provide empirical evidence that internal benchmarking within a 
firm is used in target setting, there is limited evidence on the use of external benchmarking in target setting, 
because data about industry peer performance are often costly to obtain and available only with a time lag 
(Hansen et al. 2003). Consistent with these limitations of external benchmarking, Dekker et al. (2012) report 
that external benchmarking is used much less than past performance or internal planning data to set targets 
for middle-level managers.  
Another potential external source of information in target setting, which has not received much 
attention in the literature, is externally informed performance expectations. There are several reasons why 
external performance expectations can be useful in setting targets for incentive contracts, particularly for 
the senior executives of public firms. First, external performance expectations provide an independent and 
direct estimate of firm-specific performance. Second, they reflect an additional information set of external 
parties that provide the estimates. Finally, they are readily available for public firms, for example, in the 
form of analyst forecasts. Thus, in terms of the extent to which managers can influence the information, the 
informativeness, and the cost of information collection (Murphy 2000), external performance expectations 
should be useful for target setting.4, 5  
Anecdotal evidence is also consistent with the use of external performance expectations in the 
                                                 
4 Theory provides another reason why external performance expectations can be useful in improving the efficiency of 
incentive contracts. Mittendorf and Zhang (2005) provide a principal-agent model in which the principal (owner) 
benefits from relying on the performance forecasts of independent external agents (i.e., analysts), even when the agent 
(manager) provides earnings guidance based on her private earnings observation. In this model, analysts act as 
information intermediaries to discipline the agent because they, faced with the possibility that the manager’s guidance 
is biased, conduct their own research, rather than repeating the manager’s guidance. In other words, firms can improve 
their incentive contracts by using the interaction/tension between managers and external agents who provide 
independent estimates of firm performance. 
5 In addition, the emphasis on meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (Graham et al. 2005) and the need to justify 
the performance targets in incentive contracts under extensive compensation disclosure requirements (Indjejikian et 




practice of target setting. For example, the 2014 proxy statement of Biogen Inc. states that the firm considers 
analysts’ projections for firm performance in setting annual goals in addition to internal forecasts and peer 
performance (see Appendix A for details). Mercer (2009), a compensation-consulting firm, also 
recommends the use of analysts’ expectations as an important source of external information.  
Based on the preceding discussion, we state our first hypothesis as follows:  
H1: External performance expectations are positively associated with adjustments to performance 
targets in executive bonus contracts. 
Next, we discuss our cross-sectional predictions about the use of external performance expectations 
in target setting, based on Murphy’s (2000) three criteria for evaluating the information sources in target 
setting: information collection cost, informativeness, and the extent to which the information is influenced 
by managers. To the extent that the cost of collecting information about external performance expectations 
is low, firms are expected to determine the weight on external performance expectations based on their 
informativeness and the extent to which they are influenced by managers (i.e., independence). Following 
the arguments of Ittner et al. (2003), we assume that a measure’s predictive ability for future financial 
performance provides a reasonable proxy for its informativeness in contracting. Therefore, we expect firms 
to allocate more weight in target setting to external performance expectations when they are more 
informative about future firm performance. Moreover, to the extent that managers can affect external 
performance expectations, we predict that firms allocate more weight to external performance expectations 
when they are less likely to be influenced by managers. Based on these discussions, we present our second 
and third hypotheses as follows:  
H2: The use of external performance expectations in the revision of target setting is more 
pronounced when they are more informative about future firm performance. 
  
H3: The use of external performance expectations in the revision of target setting is more 






3. Research Design and Sample 
 3.1. Research Design 
As an empirical proxy for external performance expectations, we use the consensus of analysts’ 
annual earnings forecasts that are available before the annual bonus plan is determined. Sell-side analysts, 
who are employed by brokerage firms or independent research firms, provide their forecasts about firms’ 
earnings in their research reports, along with their estimates of target prices and stock recommendations. 
The consensus earnings forecasts, which aggregate all available individual forecasts, are readily available 
from commercial websites or data vendors (e.g., I/B/E/S and Zacks).  
To examine the association between target revisions and analyst forecasts, we build on target setting 
research (Leone and Rock 2002, Bouwens and Kroos 2011, Aranda et al. 2014, Indjejikian et al. 2014a, 
Kim and Shin 2017). Specifically, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test 
H1 (i.e., whether external performance expectations are positively associated with target revisions in 
executive bonus contracts):  
Target revisioni,t+1 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1 Target deviationi,t + 𝜆2 Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  
        + 𝜆3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 + 𝜆4 Relative-to-peersi,t + 𝜆5 Growthi,t+1  
        + 𝜆6 D_NEGi,t + 𝜆7 Reti,t + 𝜆8 Guidei,t+1 + Year and industry fixed effects + εi,t      (1) 
 
The dependent variable is Target revisioni,t+1, which is defined as (Target EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t) 
divided by Target EPSi,t. Target deviationi,t is a proxy for past actual performance relative to the 
performance target, defined as (Actual EPSi,t − Target EPSi,t) divided by Target EPSi,t. To capture any 
asymmetry in target ratcheting, we include an indicator variable for unfavorable performance variances, 
D_NEGi,t, and its interaction with Target deviationi,t (Leone and Rock 2002, Kim and Shin 2017). D_NEGi,t 
equals 1 if Target deviationi,t is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Our main variable of interest is Analyst forecast devi,t+1, analysts’ estimates of future EPS over the 
realized EPS. Specifically, Analyst forecast devi,t+1 is defined as (Analyst forecasti,t+1 − Actual EPSi,t) 
divided by Target EPSi,t, where Analyst forecasti,t+1 is the average of the most recent forecasts of year t+1 
earnings issued over the period from the announcement of year t earnings to the approval date of the annual 
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bonus plan for year t+1.6 If the approval date is missing, we use the end date of the 3 months after the fiscal 
year-end as the approval date. This way of measuring analyst forecasts ensures that they are not affected 
by stale forecasts and that analysts incorporate information about year t earnings. Figure 1 illustrates the 
timeline of analyst forecasts used in our analyses. A positive coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 indicates 
that targets are revised upward when analysts expect earnings for year t+1 to be greater than the realized 
earnings for year t. If analyst forecasts do not convey any incremental information over other variables in 
the model (e.g., past performance and peer performance), λ3 would not be different from 0.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Recent studies on target setting argue that managers’ past performance relative to peers affects 
future targets and the extent of target ratcheting, which underscores the importance of controlling for peer 
performance (Aranda et al. 2014, Indjejikian et al. 2014 a and b, Bol and Lill 2015). Therefore, we include 
a measure for a firm’s performance compared to its peers (Relative-to-peersi,t), which we define as the 
firm’s basic EPS for year t minus industry peers’ average basic EPS for year t. We follow Albuquerque 
(2009) to construct industry-size-matched peer portfolios.7 We also include firms’ stock returns (Reti,t) to 
control for events that affect both future target revisions and analyst forecasts.8 To the extent that stock 
returns reflect all publicly available information, controlling for stock returns can mitigate the possibility 
that our model merely captures an association due to the common information available to both analysts 
and compensation committees. Reti,t is the firm’s stock returns over the 12-month period that ends 3 months 
after fiscal year-end t. To control for the presence of management forecasts, we include Guidei,t+1, an 
                                                 
6 The approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1 is on average 53 days after the end of fiscal year t.  
7 To calculate peer performance, we construct peer portfolios matched on industry and firm size. First, we form annual 
portfolios based on two-digit standard industry classification (SIC) codes. We use all of the firms on Compustat to 
construct the portfolios. Second, we sort firms by beginning-of-year market value into size quartiles. Third, we match 
each firm with an industry-size peer group. Peer performance is the equal-weighted portfolio EPS for an industry-size 
peer group. When calculating portfolio EPS, we exclude the EPS of the observed firm. 
8 For example, when oil prices increase, both firms and analysts may revise their expectations of future performance 
downward, resulting in a positive correlation between the target revisions and analyst forecasts. By controlling for 
stock returns, which contain information about public news, we expect Analyst forecast devi,t+1 to reflect analysts’ 
unique information set beyond public information.  
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indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm issues management forecasts over the period from the 
announcement of year t earnings to the approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1.  
Indjejikian et al. (2014b) suggest that the relation between target revisions and past performance 
may be attributable to firm-specific growth. To control for the effect of firm-specific growth in target setting 
(Aranda et al. 2014, Indjejikian et al. 2014 a and b, Kim and Shin 2017), we include anticipated growth in 
EPS (Growthi,t+1) in our model. Specifically, we measure Growthi,t+1 as the predicted value from the 
following model: 
EPS growthi,t+1 = 𝛼0+ 𝛼1 Past EPS growthi,t + 𝛼2 Sizei,t + 𝛼3 EPi,t + 𝛼4 Leverage i,t  
      + 𝛼5 MKTi,t + 𝛼6 RDi,t + 𝛼7 CAPi,t + 𝛼8 BTMi,t + 𝛼9 Div yieldi,t  
      + 𝛼10 Past RETi,t + εi,t                                                                                           (2) 
 
The dependent variable in Equation (2) is EPS growthi,t+1, which is defined as the EPS growth 
between year t and t+1. Following research on the factors that affect the growth of accounting earnings and 
sales (Chan et al. 2003, Ciftci and Cready 2011, Gong and Li 2013), we control for past growth in EPS over 
the previous 3 years (Past EPS growth), the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Size), the 
earnings-to-price ratio (EP), leverage (Leverage), advertising expenses divided by sales (MKT), the average 
of R&D expenses divided by sales over the previous 3 years (RD), the average of capital expenditures 
divided by total assets over the previous 3 years (CAP), the book-to-market ratio (BTM), the dividend yield 
ratio (Div yield), and stock returns over the previous 12 months (Past RET). We estimate Equation (2) 
separately for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC code group.9  
3.2. Sample 
Our initial sample consists of S&P 1500 firms for the fiscal years of 2006 to 2014. We focus on 
firms that use EPS as a performance measure in their CEOs’ annual bonus contracts because EPS is the 
most widely used performance measure in annual bonus contracts and analysts’ EPS forecasts are widely 
available. We hand-collect EPS targets, thresholds, and maximums and actual EPS for CEOs from the 
                                                 
9 Section 6.4.1 discusses alternative ways to measure expected growth. 
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CD&A sections of proxy statements. Detailed information on each plan is disclosed in the “Short-term 
Incentives” section.10 Appendix B provides an example of the CD&A section of a proxy statement for El 
Paso Electric Company. This company provides information on performance measures (EPS with 50% 
weight), performance targets ($2.30), and actual performance ($2.27) in its 2014 executive annual bonuses.  
We obtain stock return data from CRSP and financial statement data from Compustat. We collect 
analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S. Table 1 summarizes our sample selection procedure. Of the initial 
sample of 13,140 firm-years, 3,303 firm-years use EPS as a performance measure for CEO annual bonus 
contracts. We exclude firm-years that lack EPS target information and those with missing analyst forecast 
information and control variables.11 As our main regression model requires EPS target and performance 
data for at least two consecutive years, we further exclude firm-years that lack such data. Our final sample 
consists of 1,179 firm-year observations over the 2006 to 2014 period.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our key variables, including Target revisioni,t+1, 
Target deviationi,t, Analyst forecast devi,t+1, and several firm characteristics. For ease of interpretation, we 
also present the descriptive statistics of the unscaled variables: (Target EPSi,t+1 – Target EPSi,t), (Actual 
EPSi,t – Target EPSi,t), and (Analyst forecasti,t+1 − Actual EPSi,t). The mean (median) values of (Target 
EPSi,t+1 – Target EPSi,t) and Target revisioni,t+1 are $0.202 ($0.215) and 11.6% (9.8%), respectively, 
suggesting that EPS targets are typically revised upward by 20.2 cents (11.6% of prior target EPS). The 
mean of (Actual EPSi,t – Target EPSi,t) is $0.039, whereas the actual EPS is 1.7% higher than the target (i.e., 
Target deviationi,t) on average, indicating that actual performance is, on average, slightly higher than the 
target. The mean values of (Analyst forecasti,t+1 − Actual EPSi,t) and Analyst forecast devi,t+1 are $0.164 and 
                                                 
10 Our main analyses use the target value and thus do not incorporate information about the threshold or maximum 
(target) value. In an untabulated analysis, we find that thresholds and maximums are commonly set to 80% and 120% 
of the target value. For example, the mean (median) values of the thresholds and maximums in our sample are 82.5% 
(86.7%) and 119.5% (114.8%), respectively. The practice of setting thresholds and maximums to 80% and 120% of 
the target value is observed across most of the industries in our sample. 
11 If a stock split occurs during the year, we exclude that firm-year observation from our sample. 
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11.0%, respectively, indicating that analyst EPS forecasts are 16.4 cents (11%) higher than prior actual EPS 
on average. The means of the market value of equity and book value of total assets are $12,530 million and 
$16,629 million, respectively. Lastly, the mean (median) value of Relative-to-peersi,t is 0.774 (0.602).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix of our key variables. (Target EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t) is 
positively associated with (Actual EPSi,t − Target EPSi,t), suggesting that targets tend to be revised in the 
same direction as past performance variances. (Target EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t) is also positively correlated 
with (Analyst forecasti,t+1 − Actual EPSi,t), providing univariate evidence to support our first hypothesis that 
external performance expectations are positively associated with the revision of targets. The positive 
correlation between (Target EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t) and Growthi,t+1 highlights the importance of controlling 
for firm-specific growth in the empirical models that attempt to explain firms’ target revisions (Indjejikian 
et al. 2014b).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Association Between External Performance Expectations and the Revision of Targets (H1) 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation (1). Column (1) shows the baseline results 
without Analyst forecast devi,t+1. Consistent with previous studies, the coefficient on Target deviationi,t is 
significantly positive, suggesting that firms consider past performance variances in revising targets (i.e., 
target ratcheting). The coefficient on Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t is significantly negative, consistent with 
previous findings that targets tend to ratchet asymmetrically (Leone and Rock 2002, Bouwens and Kroos 
2011, Aranda et al. 2014, Kim and Shin 2017). A significantly negative coefficient on Relative-to-peersi,t 
suggests that firms outperforming their peers (i.e., those with higher values of Relative-to-peersi,t) 
experience downward target revisions in the subsequent period (Aranda et al. 2014, Indjejikian et al. 2014a, 
Kim and Shin 2017).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Column (2) of Table 4 provides the estimation results to test H1 that external performance 
expectations are positively associated with the target revisions in bonus contracts. The coefficient on 
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 is positive and significant, suggesting that analysts’ performance expectations 
above (below) the realized past performance are associated with upward (downward) revisions in targets. 
This finding is consistent with the argument that firms use analyst forecasts as an external information 
source in revising future bonus targets, going above and beyond information about past and relative 
performance. In terms of economic significance, the magnitude of the coefficient (0.376) indicates that an 
interquartile change in Analyst forecast devi,t+1 from the first quartile (Q1) to the third quartile (Q3) is 
associated with an 8.08% increase in future targets. Furthermore, including the analyst forecast variable 
increases the adjusted R2 from 58.03% in Column (1) to 69.68% in Column (2), highlighting the importance 
of analyst forecasts as an additional information source in target setting. 
We also note that the coefficient on peer performance, which is significant in Column (1), becomes 
marginally insignificant once analyst forecast information is included in Column (2). This finding indicates 
that analyst forecasts subsume peer information as an information source in target setting, consistent with 
a limited use of external benchmarking in the target-setting practice.12 Overall, the results in Table 4 support 
our first hypothesis that external performance expectations (i.e., analyst forecasts) are positively associated 
with target revisions. 
As a supplementary analysis, we test whether incorporating analyst forecasts in target setting 
improves target accuracy. Based on Indjejikian and Nanda’s (2002) argument, Bouwens and Kroos (2017) 
design a test examining whether firms set more accurate targets when non-financial information is 
incorporated in target setting in addition to financial information. They find that sales target deviations are 
less serially correlated when both financial and non-financial information are incorporated in target setting, 
suggesting that target accuracy improves with the inclusion of non-financial measures into target setting. 
                                                 
12 In Section 6.4.1, we examine whether the insignificant results for peer performance are due to measurement errors 
in our approach to identifying peer groups based on firm size and industry membership. We find that using an 
alternative way to identify peer groups does not change the results.  
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Similarly, we examine whether the inclusion of analyst forecasts enhances target accuracy by comparing 
the extent to which current target deviations explain next-period target deviations when firms incorporate 
analyst forecasts into target setting, compared to when firms do not incorporate analyst forecasts. 
Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
|Target deviationi,t+1|= λ0 + λ1 |Target deviationi,t | +                                                  (3)  
|Target deviationi,t| is the absolute value of (Actual EPSi,t − Target EPSi,t) divided by Target EPSi,t. 
Following Bouwens and Kroos (2017), we define |Target deviationi,t+1| in two different ways. The first is 
the absolute value of the actual target deviation in period t+1, measured as the absolute value of (Actual 
EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t+1) divided by Target EPSi,t. The second is the counterfactual target deviation in 
period t+1 assuming that analyst forecast information is not used in target setting, measured as the absolute 
value of (Actual EPSi,t+1 − Predicted Target EPSi,t+1) divided by Target EPSi,t. Predicted Target EPSi,t+1 is 
estimated as the sum of Target EPSi,t and the predicted target revision for year t+1 from Equation (1) that 
excludes Analyst forecast devi, t+1. Because a significant serial correlation in target deviations indicates that 
all available information is not fully incorporated into targets (i.e., less accurate), to the extent that 
incorporating analyst forecasts into targets improves target accuracy, we predict that the ability of current 
target deviations to explain next-period target deviations (i.e., R2 from Equation (3)) is lower when analyst 
forecasts are incorporated into target setting than when they are not incorporated. 
Table 5 presents the results. In Column (1), in which the dependent variable is the absolute value 
of the actual target deviation in period t+1 (i.e., next-year targets incorporate analyst forecasts), the 
coefficient on |Target deviationi,t| is 0.559 and the R2 is 15.15%. In Column (2), in which the dependent 
variable is the counterfactual target deviation in period t+1 (i.e., next-year targets do not incorporate analyst 
forecasts), the coefficient is 0.652 and the R2 is 16.62%. The Vuong (1989) test statistic shows that the 
difference in the R2 between the two models is statistically significant. The higher R2 of the second model 
suggests that current target deviations explain next-period target deviations more when the targets do not 




accuracy.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5.2. Effects of the Informativeness of External Performance Expectations on Their Use in Target 
Setting (H2) 
Next, we test whether the use of external performance expectations in target setting is more 
pronounced when they are more informative about future firm performance (H2). We use two approaches 
to test this prediction. First, we use analysts’ forecast accuracy, their dispersion, and the number of analysts 
following the firm to proxy for the accuracy/noisiness of analyst forecasts and predict that the use of analyst 
forecasts increases when analyst forecast errors are low, when forecasts are less dispersed, and when more 
analysts provide estimates.13 While intuitive, this approach has the limitation that these proxies may simply 
reflect the overall information uncertainty of the firm (e.g., due to volatile business) instead of the 
informativeness of analyst forecasts. Therefore, we use the second approach of measuring the relative 
information advantage of analysts versus managers because it enables us to pinpoint the source of the 
relative advantage of analyst forecasts compared to other sources (e.g., managers’ own information). Hutton 
et al. (2012) document that analyst forecasts are more accurate than management forecasts approximately 
50% of the time and then examine the circumstances in which analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than 
managers’ forecasts. They find that analysts’ information advantage comes from their superior ability to 
assess macroeconomic factors. Specifically, analyst forecasts are more accurate than management forecasts 
                                                 
13 Although our approach using analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for forecasting uncertainty is common in the 
literature, forecast dispersion can alternatively proxy for the extent to which analyst forecasts are influenced by 
managers (i.e., H3), as it is more difficult for managers to guide analysts when forecasts are more dispersed (Cotter et 
al. 2006). Therefore, one can argue that more dispersed forecasts represent more independent information and thus are 
given more weight in target setting, leading to an opposite prediction to ours in H2. However, the relation between 
managers’ guidance and forecast dispersion is not clear. For example, Houston et al. (2010) report that managers are 
more likely to stop providing guidance when analyst forecast dispersion is high because it is difficult for managers to 
predict future earnings with precisions when forecast uncertainty is high (as reflected in high analyst forecast 
dispersion), suggesting that managers’ ability to guide analysts can be negatively associated with forecast dispersion. 
Thus, we make no specific prediction about the relation between dispersion and analyst independence (i.e., H3). In 
addition, although a higher number of analysts following the firm can also indicate managers’ difficulty in influencing 
the consensus, this leads to the same prediction as ours that the weight on analyst forecasts increases with the number 
of analysts following the firm.  
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for firms whose earnings are highly exposed to macroeconomic factors, such as GDP.14 Based on their 
finding, we predict that firms put more weight on analyst forecasts in target setting when their performance 
is strongly correlated with macroeconomic factors, a situation in which analysts have an information 
advantage over managers. We estimate the following OLS regression to test these predictions: 
Target revisioni,t+1 = λ 0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  
                                 + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1  
                                 + λ4 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast error quartilei,t  
                                 + λ5 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1  
                                 + λ6 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Analyst followingi,t+1   
                                 + λ7 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Cyclicalityi,t + λ8 Forecast error quartilei,t  
                                 + λ9 Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1 + λ10 Analyst followingi,t  
                                 + λ11 Cyclicalityi,t + λ12 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ13 Growthi,t+1 + λ14 D_NEGi,t 
                                 + λ15 Reti,t + λ16 Guidei,t+1 + Year and industry fixed effects +                                (4)                                                               
We include four variables in the model to reflect the informativeness of analyst forecasts: 1) analyst 
forecast errors, 2) analyst forecast dispersion, 3) the number of analysts following the firm, and 4) the 
degree to which GDP explains firm performance. Forecast error quartilei,t is defined as the quartile rank of 
analyst forecast errors for year t. Analyst forecast errors for year t are calculated as the absolute value of 
actual EPS minus the average of the most recent analyst forecasts of year t earnings issued from the 
announcement of year t-1 earnings to the announcement of year t earnings, scaled by Target EPSi,t t (Mikhail 
et al. 1997). Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1 is the quartile rank of analyst forecast dispersion, where 
forecast dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of year t+1 earnings, scaled 
by Target EPSi,t (Cheong and Thomas 2011), where we use the forecasts of year t+1 earnings issued over 
the period from the announcement of year t earnings to the approval date of the annual bonus plan for year 
t+1. Analyst followingi,t+1 is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm.  
To capture the information advantage of analysts over managers, we follow Hutton et al. (2012) 
and construct Cyclicalityi,t to capture analysts’ expertise in assessing the effects of macroeconomic factors 
                                                 
14 Managers’ relative information advantage over analysts comes from their ability to make decisions to respond to 
unusual operation situations, because analysts find it difficult to anticipate these actions by managers. Hutton et al. 




on firm performance. Cyclicalityi,t is defined as the R2 from the following firm-specific regression over at 
least 4 of the prior 5 years:  
IBi,t = β0 + β1GDPt + εi,t                                                     (5) 
 
where IBi,t is income before extraordinary items and GDPt is nominal annual GDP. A higher value of 
Cyclicality indicates that a firm’s earnings are highly correlated with the overall economy.15  
Table 6 shows our results from estimating Equation (4).16 The coefficients on Analyst forecast 
devi,t+1 × Forecast error quartilei,t (-0.071; t-value = -1.66) and Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast 
dispersion quartilei,t+1 (-0.215; t-value = -6.71) are significantly negative. This suggests that firms are less 
likely to rely on analyst forecasts in revising targets when forecast errors or dispersion is high. The 
coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Analyst followingi,t+1 is positive and significant (0.101; t-value = 
1.71), indicating that the use of analyst forecast information increases when more analysts provide earnings 
forecasts for the firm.  
Regarding the effect of analysts’ informational advantage on firms’ use of analyst forecasts in target 
setting, we find that the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Cyclicalityi,t is significantly positive (0.221; 
t-value = 1.75). The results indicate that when a firm’s earnings are highly correlated with GDP, firms 
exploit analysts’ information advantage by relying more on analyst forecasts in setting their annual bonus 
targets. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 support our cross-sectional predictions that the use of analyst 
forecasts in target setting is more pronounced when analyst forecasts are more informative, consistent with 
the economic theory on target setting (Murphy 2000). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
  
                                                 
15 The value of Cyclicality is high when the relation between firm performance and GDP is significantly positive (i.e., 
cyclical) or significantly negative (i.e., countercyclical). 
16 The sample size is reduced from 1,179 in Table 4 to 1,158 in Table 6, as we require non-missing values for additional 
variables, such as forecast dispersion and cyclicality.  
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5.3. Effects of the Extent to Which External Performance Expectations are Affected by Managers 
on Their Use in Target Setting (H3) 
 
While external performance expectations are assumed to be independent of managers’ influence, 
managers may affect external performance expectations to some extent. If there is variation in the extent to 
which external performance expectations are affected by managers, we predict that compensation 
committees incorporate the variation into their weighting decision in target setting. Our use of analyst 
forecasts as an empirical proxy for external performance expectations enables us to test this prediction. 
Whereas analysts are outsiders who provide independent estimates of future earnings based on their own 
research, managers can affect analyst forecasts either by privately communicating with analysts or by 
publicly providing earnings guidance. In addition, analysts have their own incentives to issue biased (e.g., 
optimistic) forecasts because of their investment banking relationships with the firms they follow (Dugar 
and Nathan 1995) or to obtain favorable access to private information from managers (Chen and Matsumoto 
2006). If managers have the incentive and ability to influence analyst forecasts downward to obtain easier 
targets in their bonus contracts, such as by issuing pessimistic management forecasts to lower the consensus, 
the benefit of relying on analyst forecasts as an external source of information would be reduced.  
However, we believe that these issues do not significantly impair the overall independence of 
analysts for the following reasons. First, several regulations have been introduced since 2000 to enhance 
the independence of analysts’ research. Specifically, Regulation Fair Disclosure enacted in 2000 prohibits 
selective disclosures of material information to certain groups (e.g., individual analysts), and NASD Rule 
2711 and NYSE Rule 472 introduced in 2002 prohibit linking analyst compensation to investment banking 
business. Furthermore, the 2003 Global Analysts Research Settlement requires the separation of the 
research department from the investment banking department. Empirical findings suggest that analysts’ 
independence is indeed enhanced as a result of these regulatory changes (Barniv et al. 2009, Chen and Chen 
2009), mitigating the concern about analysts’ independence in the recent period. Second, from the stylized 
fact that analyst forecasts are initially optimistic and are gradually revised downward so that firms can beat 
the targets when earnings are announced, we infer that managers have incentives to guide analysts’ annual 
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earnings forecasts downward toward beatable forecasts later in the year as they learn the actual outcome 
with certainty, but not early in the year (i.e., in the beginning of the year when compensation is 
determined).17  
Although we expect analyst forecasts to be generally less likely to be affected by managers’ 
opportunistic behaviors for obtaining easy targets, there may be cross-sectional variation in the degree to 
which managers affect analyst forecasts. Thus, we examine whether the use of analyst forecasts varies 
depending on the perceived independence of analyst forecasts. We use affiliated versus unaffiliated analysts 
as a proxy for the extent to which analyst forecasts are influenced by managers. Affiliated analysts are those 
whose brokerage firms acted as the lead underwriter or co-underwriter of the covered firm’s initial public 
offering (IPO) or seasoned equity offering (SEO) and they are often regarded as less independent than 
unaffiliated analysts (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2014). Therefore, to the extent that compensation 
committees view the forecasts of unaffiliated analysts as more independent, firms are predicted to put more 
weight in target setting on the forecasts of unaffiliated analysts than on the forecasts of affiliated analysts. 
To test this prediction, we identify firms for which the EPS forecasts of both affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts are available and measure two different Analyst forecast devi, t+1 using the forecasts of affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts, respectively.18  
Column (1) of Table 7 reports the estimation results when Analyst forecast devi, t+1 is measured 
based on the forecasts of affiliated analysts, whereas Column (2) reports the results based on the forecasts 
of unaffiliated analysts. While the coefficients on Analyst forecast devi, t+1 are positive and significant in 
both columns, the magnitude of the coefficient (0.580) in Column (1) (i.e., affiliated analysts) is smaller 
than that (0.620) in Column (2) (i.e., unaffiliated analysts). This difference is statistically significant (p-
                                                 
17 As a result, analysts’ annual forecasts with long forecast horizons are usually optimistic, whereas quarterly forecasts 
with short forecast horizons tend to be pessimistic. Consistent with the argument that managers’ decision to issue 
management forecasts depends on the forecast horizon, Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) find that managers tend 
to walk-down analysts’ optimistic short-horizon (i.e., quarterly) forecasts, but they are disinclined to walk-down 
optimistic long-horizon (i.e., annual) forecasts.  
18 Due to our requirement for the presence of both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts for a firm, the sample size is 
reduced to 119 for the analysis in Table 7. 
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value = 0.029). This finding suggests that the weight placed on the forecasts of unaffiliated analysts is 
greater than those of affiliated analysts, consistent with our third hypothesis (H3) that the use of external 
performance expectations is more pronounced when they are less likely to be affected by managers.  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
As an alternative way to test H3, we divide analyst forecasts into those issued before management 
forecasts and those issued after management forecasts, for a subsample with available management 
forecasts issued over the period from the announcement of year t earnings to the approval date of the annual 
bonus plan for year t+1. To the extent that management forecasts can influence analyst forecasts, we view 
that analyst forecasts issued before management forecasts provide more independent and objective 
performance expectations than those issued after management forecasts. Thus, we measure two different 
Analyst forecast devi, t+1 using analyst forecasts issued before management forecasts and those issued after 
management forecasts, respectively, and estimate Equation (1) separately. In untabulated analyses, we find 
that the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi, t+1 based on analyst forecasts issued before management 
forecasts (0.724) is significantly greater than the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi, t+1 based on analyst 
forecasts issued after management forecasts (0.439) (p-value for the difference = 0.00).19 This finding 
corroborates the previous result based on the affiliated versus unaffiliated analyst classification.20 
6. Additional Analyses 
6.1. Relative Importance of Analyst Forecasts Versus Management Forecasts in Target Setting 
                                                 
19 As we require (i) a firm to have management forecasts issued from the announcement of year t earnings to the 
approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1 (i.e., measurement period) and (ii) both analyst forecasts issued 
before management forecasts and those issued after management forecasts to be available over this measurement 
period, the sample size is reduced to 78 for this analysis. Alternatively, when we extend the measurement period to 
the period from the fiscal year-end for year t to the approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1, we find similar 
results for the sample of 513 observations (untabulated).   
20 In these analyses, we compare the weight on affiliated analysts’ forecasts to that on unaffiliated analysts’ forecasts 
(or the weight on analyst forecasts before management forecasts to that after management forecasts) using two separate 
regressions. A possible alternative approach is to estimate one model that includes both affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts’ forecasts (or that includes both analyst forecasts before and after management forecasts). The results from 
this alternative approach are qualitatively similar to those from the main approach. However, we do not tabulate them, 
because the variance inflation factors for Analyst forecast devi,t+1 are greater than 10, indicating a multicollinearity 
problem with the alternative approach. 
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One can argue that internal future planning information (e.g., internal budgeting) is more important 
than analyst forecasts in target setting because the former reflects managers’ private information. However, 
internal planning information is subject to managers’ opportunistic behaviors. For example, previous 
studies find that using budgets in performance evaluation can cause managers to understate their expected 
productivity (Young 1985, Chow et al. 1988). Anderson et al. (2010) find that managers tend to set easy 
targets after the introduction of a performance-based bonus plan. Furthermore, Cassar and Gibson (2008) 
report that budget preparation does not improve managers’ forecast accuracy because budgets are used not 
only for forecasting performance but also for other purposes, such as communicating objectives and 
motivating employees. Considering these issues, independent compensation committees should be 
unwilling to use the information provided by managers themselves in setting targets. Overall, whether 
internal future planning information is more important than analyst forecasts in target setting remains an 
empirical question.  
To examine the relative importance of analyst forecasts versus internal planning information in 
target setting, we use managers’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for internal planning information and include 
them in our regressions.21 Specifically, for the subsample with available management forecasts, we control 
for the information in management earnings forecasts and estimate the following regression:  
Target revisioni,t+1 = λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  
                                  + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 + λ4 Management forecast devi,t+1  
                                  + λ5 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ6 Growthi,t+1 + λ7 D_NEGi,t + λ8 Reti,t  
                                  + Year and industry fixed effects + εi,t                                                         (6) 
 
 Management forecast devi,t+1 is the difference between Management forecasti,t+1 and Actual EPSi,t, 
divided by Target EPSi,t, where Management forecasti,t+1 is the most recent management forecasts of year 
t+1 earnings issued over the period from the announcement of year t earnings to the approval date of the 
annual bonus plan for year t+1. If firms rely on information in analyst earnings forecasts to set targets above 
                                                 
21 Previous studies have established a theoretical link between external management earnings forecasts and internal 
management planning information (Hemmer and Labro 2008). Such studies have used management earnings forecasts 
as a proxy for internal planning and budget information (Goodman et al. 2014). 
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and beyond the information in management earnings forecasts, the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 
(λ3) would be positive and significant even after controlling for Management forecasts devi,t+1. As presented 
in Table 2, the mean (median) values of (Management forecasti,t+1 – Actual EPSi,t) and Management 
forecast devi,t+1 are $0.052 ($0.110) and 2.6% (5.0%), respectively. Table 3 shows a positive correlation 
between (Target EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t) and (Management forecast i,t+1 − Actual EPSi,t). 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of estimating Equation (6) for a reduced sample with 
available management forecast data. As a starting point, Column (1) shows the results of estimating the 
model without Analyst forecast devi,t+1. The coefficient on Management forecast devi,t+1 is significantly 
positive, suggesting that management forecasts are an important source of information in setting annual 
bonus targets. However, in Column (2), where both analyst and management forecast variables are included 
in the model, the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 is significantly positive, whereas the coefficient on 
Management forecast devi,t+1 loses its significance.22 Overall, these results suggest that firms rely more on 
the information in analyst earnings forecasts than on the information in management earnings forecasts.  
A potential issue related to estimating Equation (6) is that analyst forecasts can be affected by 
management forecasts (Hassell et al. 1988), as we discuss in Section 5.3.23 In this scenario, the information 
in management forecasts may be an underlying factor in the association between analyst forecasts and target 
revisions. To check this possibility, we use several approaches as follows. 
First, we estimate Equation (1) using a subsample of firms that do not issue management earnings 
forecasts, in which analyst forecasts are free from the influence of management forecasts. In Column (3), 
the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 remains positive and significant for the subsample without 
                                                 
22 The variance inflation factors for Analyst forecast devi,t+1 and Management forecast devi,t+1 are relatively low at 2.42 
and 2.50, respectively. Therefore, any multicollinearity in the model is not severe. 
23 For example, Hassell et al. (1988) document that the sign and magnitude of the news from management forecasts 
are positively associated with those of analyst forecast revisions. 
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management forecasts, suggesting that analyst forecast information itself is important in target setting, even 
when it is not influenced by management forecasts.24   
Second, we measure analyst forecasts over the period before management forecasts are issued. 
When we include Analyst forecasti,t+1, alternatively defined as the most recent forecasts of year t+1 earnings 
issued over the period from the announcement of year t earnings to the date of the management forecast 
issuance, the results do not change, as reported in Column (4).   
Third, we also measure analyst forecasts over the period after management forecasts are issued to 
check whether potentially “walked-down” analyst forecasts provide any incremental information in target 
setting above management forecasts. If analyst earnings forecasts, which may be affected by management 
forecasts, provide no further incremental information, the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 should be 
insignificant when the model controls for management forecasts. However, the results using this measure 
of analyst forecasts reported in Column (5) are similar to those in Column (4), suggesting that the 
association between analyst forecasts and target revisions that we document is independent of the influence 
of management forecasts.  
Overall, the findings in Panel A of Table 8 lend support to the notion that analyst forecasts provide 
incremental information above and beyond management forecasts in explaining target revisions. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
6.2. Potential Reverse Causality: Analyst Forecast Revisions Around the Approval Date of the 
Annual Bonus Plan 
One may argue that the positive association between analyst forecasts and firms’ bonus target 
revisions is derived from analysts’ practice of updating their forecasts based on firms’ internal targets (i.e., 
reverse causality). We believe that this concern is largely mitigated in our analyses because we use analyst 
forecasts issued before the approval date of the plan and bonus plan details are not typically publicly 
                                                 
24 Grabner et al. (2016) find that the quality of the target-setting process is positively associated with the probability 
of issuing management guidance. However, they also suggest that a high-quality target-setting process does not 
guarantee the accuracy of management forecasts because managers use their informational advantage strategically to 
increase the likelihood of meeting or beating market expectations. If compensation committees recognize this 
phenomenon, they would prefer analyst forecasts to management forecasts when setting bonus targets. 
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available until proxy statements are disclosed. Nevertheless, we explore this possibility by examining 
individual analyst forecast revisions around the bonus plan approval dates. Specifically, we examine 
whether individual analysts revise their forecasts upward (downward) after the approval date if bonus 
targets are set higher (lower) than their own previous forecasts.  
Low bonus targeti,j,t+1 (High bonus targeti,j,t+1) equals 1 if the bonus target for year t+1 is lower 
(higher) than Analyst forecasti,j,t+1 and 0 otherwise, where Analyst forecasti,j,t+1 represents the most recent 
forecasts of an individual analyst for year t+1 earnings issued before the bonus plan approval date. Walked-
down analyst forecasti,j,t+1 (Walked-up analyst forecasti,j,t+1) equals 1 if the analyst’s earliest forecast for 
year t+1 earnings issued within 7 days of the bonus plan approval date for year t+1 is lower (higher) than 
her own previous forecast issued before the approval date (i.e., Analyst forecasti,j,t+1) and 0 otherwise. If 
individual analysts revise their forecasts around the bonus plan approval date (as the reverse causality 
argument implies), we should observe a positive correlation between Low bonus targeti,j,t+1 and Walked-
down analyst forecasti,j,t+1 (High bonus targeti,j,t+1 and Walked-up analyst forecasti,j,t+1). The results in Panel 
B of Table 8 based on the sample of 665 observations with available data at the firm-year-analyst level 
show that the correlations are negative and insignificant. This suggests that reverse causality is unlikely to 
be a plausible alternative explanation for our main findings.25 
6.3. Effect of Incentives to Meet or Beat Earnings Benchmarks on the Use of Analyst Forecasts in 
Target Setting 
 
Our cross-sectional tests relating to H2 and H3 focus on the characteristics of analyst forecasts as 
an external source of information in target setting. However, firms’ use of analyst forecasts in target setting 
may be driven by the incentive of managers to meet or beat market expectations because missing the 
consensus adversely affects firm value and executives’ compensation, particularly equity-related incentives. 
                                                 
25 Our findings on the relative information advantage of analysts provide additional (indirect) evidence that rejects the 
reverse causality argument. When firm performance is strongly correlated with macroeconomic factors (i.e., when 
cyclicality is high), analysts have a relative informational advantage over managers and are therefore less likely to 
revise their forecasts based on information about internal targets. Thus, the reverse causality argument predicts the 
association between analyst forecasts and target revisions to be weaker when cyclicality is high. However, the results 




In this scenario, the use of analyst forecasts is expected to increase when managers have stronger incentives 
to meet or beat the consensus (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2017). To examine this possibility, we examine whether 
the use of analyst forecasts varies according to CEOs’ equity incentives (e.g., the CEO’s equity portfolio 
delta and the ratio of equity-related compensation to annual bonus). In untabulated results, we find that the 
interactions between these proxies for equity incentives and Analyst forecast devi,t+1 are all insignificant. 
The findings support the notion that firms’ use of analyst forecasts is driven by their need for more 
informative and independent information sources to improve the contract efficiency, rather than by their 
need to provide incentives to meet or beat the consensus EPS forecasts.  
6.4. Other Robustness Tests 
6.4.1. Alternative proxies for Growth and Relative-to-peer 
 To ensure that our findings are robust to alternative measures of expected growth, we replace 
growth in EPS (i.e., the dependent variable) in Equation (2) with growth in sales, income before 
extraordinary items, and operating income before depreciation. As Panel A of Table 9 presents, the results 
of estimating Equation (1) using these alternative Growth proxies are qualitatively similar to those 
previously reported.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 We also test the robustness of our findings by using an alternative method of identifying peers to 
measure Relative-to-peer. Specifically, we follow Jayaraman et al. (2015) and Hoberg and Phillips (2016) 
and define peer groups and Relative-to-peers based on the textual similarity of a firm’s product description 
section in its 10-K filing with that of other firms. The results using this alternative method to measure peer 
performance presented in Panel B of Table 9 are similar to those previously reported.  
6.4.2. Sample selection issue 
 Our sample selection process requires firms to have EPS-based annual bonus plans, a requirement 
that may introduce a sample selection issue. To mitigate this concern, we use the Heckman (1979) two-
stage least squares method. Specifically, in the first stage, we estimate a probit model in which a firm’s 
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decision to use EPS in bonus plans is regressed on a set of determinant variables identified in the literature 
(Huang et al. 2014, Cheng et al. 2015), including firm size, book-to-market ratio, a set of corporate 
governance measures (i.e., institutional holdings, transient institutional holdings, percentage of female 
directors, and percentage of outside directors), R&D expenditures, effective tax rates, other forms of 
executive compensation (i.e., restricted stock awards and option awards), the number of business segments, 
and the number of analysts following. In addition to these variables, we further include in the first-stage 
regression the lagged value of the industry average percentage of firms that use EPS in bonus plans to 
satisfy an “exclusion restriction.”26 The second-stage regression results with the inverse Mills’ ratio as an 
additional control variable (untabulated) are similar to our main findings, suggesting that the sample 
selection issue does not affect the main inferences. 
6.4.3. Differences in contract- and executive-specific features 
We acknowledge that a significant level of cross-sectional differences may exist in our sample in 
terms of the type of compensation plans (e.g., bonus and equity-based compensation), performance 
measures (e.g., EPS and non-EPS earnings), and executive-specific features (e.g., CEO tenure). Specifically, 
in untabulated analyses, we find that approximately 14.5% of our sample firms also use EPS as a 
performance measure for their executives’ equity-based compensation plans (e.g., stock and option grants). 
30.4% of our sample firms also use other non-EPS earnings in their bonus plans, such as net income, 
operating income, and earnings before interest and taxes. For firms that disclose the weight on EPS in bonus 
plans (N = 831), we also find that the average weight on EPS in the bonus plan is 54.3%. When other non-
EPS earnings are also used in bonus plans, the average weights on EPS and non-EPS earnings are 35.6% 
and 33.2%, respectively.  
                                                 
26 While the percentage of firms that use EPS in bonus plans in an industry may be correlated with individual firms’ 
decision to use EPS as a performance measure, there is no convincing argument for why it would directly affect 




To examine whether such differences in contract- and executive-specific features affect our main 
findings, we take the following approaches. First, we identify firms that use EPS for both equity-based 
compensation and bonus plans. We define an indicator variable that equals 1 if EPS is used for both annual 
bonus plans and equity-based compensation, and 0 if EPS is used only for annual bonus plans (Equity_EPS). 
We then include Equity_EPS and its interaction with Analyst forecast devi,t+1 in the model and find that the 
interaction is insignificant. Importantly, the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 remains positive and 
significant. In addition, including Equity_EPS in the model (without its interaction) does not change the 
results.   
Second, we identify firms that use both non-EPS earnings and EPS for annual bonus plans. We 
define an indicator variable that equals 1 if the annual bonus contract is linked to other non-EPS earnings 
and to EPS, and 0 otherwise (Bonus_Earnings). As in the previous approach, we include Bonus_Earnings 
and its interaction with Analyst forecast devi,t+1 in the model or include Bonus_Earnings as an additional 
control variable without the interaction.27 We find that the coefficient on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 remains 
significantly positive while the interaction term is not significant.28 Third, we measure the weight on EPS 
in bonus plans and include changes in the weight on EPS between year t and t+1 as an additional control 
variable along with its interaction with Analyst forecast dev. We find that the interaction is not significant 
and the main finding for Analyst forecast devi,t+1 does not change.  
Finally, to examine whether CEO tenure affects our main findings, we divide our sample into 
subsamples based on the median CEO tenure and estimate Equation (1) separately for these subsamples. 
We find that the coefficients on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 are significantly positive for both subsamples and 
the coefficients are not significantly different between the two groups, indicating that firms’ use of external 
                                                 
27 Alternatively, we estimate the model separately for two subsamples partitioned by Equity_EPS or Bonus_Earnings. 
We find that the coefficients on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 are significantly positive for both groups and that they are not 
different between the groups.  
28 We acknowledge that we do not examine the use of external performance expectations for firms that do not use EPS 
in their annual bonus plans (e.g., firms that use non-EPS earnings but not EPS) because we limit our hand collection 
of data to firms that use EPS in their bonus plans.  
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performance expectations in setting future targets does not differ between CEOs with long tenure and those 
with short tenure.29 In summary, the various analyses discussed above suggest that our main inferences are 
not affected by various contract-specific or executive-specific differences in executive compensation.  
6.4.4. Time-series analysis 
To provide additional evidence to corroborate our main findings from the pooled data, we estimate 
a firm-specific time-series regression, because Leone and Rock (2002, p. 66) suggest that “the setting of 
budgets is an inherently inter-temporal process” and thus ratcheting can be studied from the time-series 
model. Specifically, we restrict our sample to observations with no missing values of Target revisioni,t+1, 
Target deviationi,t, and Analyst forecast devi,t+1 for at least 7 years during the sample period. This restriction 
reduces our sample size from 1,179 to 332 (45 unique firms). We estimate Equation (7) for each of these 
45 firms:30 
Target revisioni,t+1 = λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t× D_NEGi,t  
                                      + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 + εi,t                                                                (7)  
 
In the untabulated results, we find that the mean of the coefficients on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 is 
positive and significant (0.697, Z-stat: 30.66), lending support to the results in Table 4.  
6.4.5. Robustness to outliers 
To check the robustness of our main findings to the effect of outliers, we perform several additional 
tests. First, we winsorize all of the variables at the 5% and 95% levels (instead of at the 1% and 99% levels, 
as used for our main results) and then re-estimate the models. Second, we estimate the models after 
truncating (instead of winsorizing) all of the variables at the 1% and 99% levels. Third, we restrict our 
sample to observations that have absolute studentized residual values of less than 2 (Belsley et al. 1980). 
Fourth, we delete any observations that have a Cook’s D value (Cook 1977) greater than 4 divided by the 
                                                 
29 Alternatively, we partition the sample based on (i) whether the CEO is close to retirement; (ii) whether CEO tenure 
is less than (equal to or greater than) 3 years; and (iii) whether CEO tenure is less than (equal to or greater than) 5 
years. We obtain similar results. When we include a variable for CEO tenure (logged value) and its interaction with 
Analyst forecast devi, t+1, the interaction is insignificant. 
30 Given that the number of observations for each regression is very small (e.g., N = 7), we do not include control 
variables in Equation (7) to conserve the degree of freedom.  
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number of observations. Finally, we re-estimate the models using the least absolute deviations estimation, 
a form of robust regression also known as median regression, which is less susceptible to the outlier problem 
(Indjejikian et al. 2014a). We also check whether our results hold across firms of different size by estimating 
the models separately for the subsamples of S&P 500 LargeCap, S&P 400 MidCap, and S&P 600 SmallCap. 
The untabulated results show that the coefficients on Analyst forecast devi,t+1 are significantly positive in 
all cases. 
 7. Conclusion 
We examine whether firms use externally informed performance expectations to set and revise 
performance targets for executive annual bonus contracts. Although economic theories suggest that firms 
use a variety of information sources in target setting, existing studies have largely focused on the use of 
past performance. A growing body of research has begun to examine various external sources of 
information (e.g., the relative performance of peers) and their roles in target setting. However, the relevance 
of external performance expectations, such as analyst earnings forecasts, in target setting has received little 
attention, despite support from theory and practice. The results reported in this study extend our 
understanding of the role of external information in firms’ target-setting process.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that external performance 
expectations, as proxied by the consensus of analysts’ EPS forecasts, are positively associated with the 
revision of future targets in bonus contracts. This result is robust to controlling for the effect of past 
performance, peer performance, expected growth, and the presence of management forecasts. This finding 
highlights the importance of external performance expectations as a source of information above and 
beyond past and peer performance. Based on the test suggested by Bouwens and Kroos (2017), we find 
evidence that incorporating analyst forecasts into target setting improves target accuracy. 
Second, we find that a firm’s reliance on external performance expectations in target revisions 
depends on their informativeness about future firm performance and that firms place more weight on 
external performance expectations when they are less likely to be affected by managers. The findings from 
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the cross-sectional tests lend further support to the notion that the association between analyst forecasts and 
target revisions varies in a manner consistent with the economic theory on target setting (Murphy 2000). 
Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests.  
We contribute to the growing literature that examines the use of information sources other than past 
performance in target setting (e.g., Bouwens and Kroos 2017). While we provide initial evidence that firms 
use externally informed performance expectations in setting internal targets for executive annual bonus 
contracts, future research may further investigate the costs and benefits of using externally informed 
performance targets, their motivational effect on managerial behaviors, and the complex interrelations 
between external and internal targets.  
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Appendix A 2014 Proxy Statement of Biogen Inc. 
 
 
2014 Performance-Based Plans 
Our executive compensation programs place a heavy emphasis on performance-based rewards. We 
maintain a short-term incentive plan, known as our annual bonus plan, as well as a long-term incentive plan. 
Awards to our NEOs under our annual bonus plan are made under our 2008 Performance-Based 
Management Incentive Plan, and awards under our long-term incentive plan are granted under our 2008 
Omnibus Equity Plan. Awards under our annual bonus plan are directly tied to the achievement of our 
annual operating goals, which are aligned with the Company’s short- and long-term strategic plans. Our 
long-term incentives are directly tied to the performance of the price of shares of our common stock, which 
align our executives’ long-term interests with the interests of our stockholders. 
 
In setting our annual goals, in addition to our internal forecasts, we consider analysts’ projections for our 
performance and the performance of companies in our peer group, as well as broad economic and industry 
trends. We establish challenging targets that result in payouts at target levels only when Company 
performance warrants it. The Compensation Committee is responsible for reviewing and approving our 
annual Company goals, targets and levels of payout (e.g., threshold, target, and maximum) and for 





Appendix B 2014 Proxy Statement of El Paso Electric Company 
 
2014 Annual Cash Bonus Plan 
 
Bonuses are paid in late February or early March after the Compensation Committee reviews the audited 
financial results and operational performance for the previous year. As reported in the Annual Report on 
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014, and as shown in the above table, the Company had net 
income of $2.27 per basic share, which includes an accrual for the cost of the bonus pool. The Company 
also met (or failed to meet) its customer satisfaction goals, its reliability goal, its three safety goals and its 
compliance goal, in each instance at the level reflected in the above table. As a result, each NEO received 
a bonus, as set forth in the table below and also in the Summary Compensation Table later in this proxy 
statement. The total bonus paid to Company employees for 2014 was approximately $7.4 million, of which 




Appendix C Variable Definitions 
 
Variables    Definitions 
Target EPSi,t = Firm i’s target EPS used in the firm’s executive bonus plan for fiscal year t. 
 
Actual EPSi,t = Firm i’s actual EPS for fiscal year t. 
 
Target revisioni,t+1 = (Target EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t) divided by Target EPSi,t. 
 
Target deviationi,t = (Actual EPSi,t − Target EPSi,t) divided by Target EPSi,t. 
 
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 = (Analyst forecasti,t+1 − Actual EPSi,t) divided by Target EPSi,t. Analyst forecasti,t+1 is 
the average analyst forecast for year t+1 earnings issued from the announcement of 
year t earnings to the approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1. If the approval 
date is missing, we use the end date of the 3 months after the fiscal year-end as the 
approval date. If an analyst issues multiple forecasts during this period, we only use 
the most recent forecast. 
 
Management forecast devi,t+1 = (Management forecasti,t+1 − Actual EPSi,t) divided by Target EPSi,t. Management 
forecasti,t+1 is the most recent management forecast for year t+1 earnings issued from 
the announcement of year t earnings to the approval date of the annual bonus plan for 
year t+1. 
 
D_NEGi,t = Equals 1 if Target deviationi,t is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Forecast error quartilei,t = The quartile rank of analyst forecast errors in the previous year. Analyst forecast errors 
are calculated as the absolute value of actual EPS minus the average of the most recent 
analyst forecasts for year t earnings issued from the announcement of year t-1 earnings 
to the announcement of year t earnings, scaled by Target EPSi,t. 
 
Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1 = The quartile rank of analyst forecast dispersion, where dispersion is measured as the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts for year t+1 earnings, scaled by Target EPSi,t.  
 
Analyst followingi,t+1 = The natural logarithm of the number of analysts who issue an EPS forecast for year 
t+1. 
Cyclicalityi,t = The R2 from the following firm-specific regression over at least 4 of the prior 5 years 
(Hutton et al. 2012):  
                                  IBi,t = β0 + β1GDPt + εi,t                                                   (5) 
where IB is income before extraordinary items and GDP is the nominal annual gross 
domestic product. 
 
Low (High) bonus targeti,j,t+1 = Equals 1 if the annual bonus target for year t+1 is lower (higher) than Analyst 
forecasti,j,t+1, and 0 otherwise. Analyst forecasti,j,t+1 is the most recent individual analyst 
forecast for year t+1 earnings issued before the approval date of the annual bonus plan 
for year t+1. 
 
Walked-down (up)  
analyst forecastsi,j,t+1 
= Equals 1 if an analyst’s earliest forecast for year t+1 earnings issued within 7 days of 
the approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1 is lower (higher) than Analyst 
forecasti,j,t+1, and 0 otherwise. Analyst forecasti,j,t+1 is the most recent individual analyst 
forecast for year t+1 earnings issued before the approval date. 
 




  EPS growthi,,t+1 = 𝛼0+ 𝛼1 Past EPS growthi,t + 𝛼2 Sizei,t + 𝛼3 EPi,t  
                               + 𝛼4 Leveragei,t + 𝛼5 MKTi,t + 𝛼6 RDi,t + 𝛼7 CAPi,t  
                               + 𝛼8 BTMi,t + 𝛼9 Div yieldi,t + 𝛼10 Past RETi,t +                     (2) 
Growthi,t+1 is the firm-level predicted value from the above cross-sectional model. 
Considering the factors that affect the growth of accounting earnings and sales (Chan 
et al. 2003, Ciftci and Cready 2011, Gong and Li 2013), we control for past growth in 
EPS over the previous 3 years (Past EPS growth), the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity (Size), the earnings-to-price ratio (EP), leverage (Leverage), 
advertising expenses divided by sales (MKT), average R&D expenses divided by sales 
over the previous 3 years (RD), average capital expenditures divided by total assets 
over the previous 3 years (CAP), the book-to-market ratio (BTM), the dividend yield 
ratio (Div yield), and stock returns over the previous 12 months (Past RET). We 
compute leverage (Leverage) as liabilities minus cash holdings over total assets minus 
cash holdings. We calculate the book-to-market ratio (BTM) as total assets divided by 
the market value of equity plus long-term liabilities. The dividend yield ratio (Div 
yield) is ordinary cash dividends divided by net income before extraordinary items. 
We estimate Equation (2) separately for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC code group.  
 
Relative-to-peersi,t = Firm i’s EPS for fiscal year t minus peer firms’ EPS for fiscal year t. Peer portfolios 
are constructed following Albuquerque (2009). To construct peer portfolios matched 
on industry and firm size, we first form annual portfolios based on two-digit SIC 
codes. We use all of the firms on Compustat to construct the portfolios. Second, we 
sort firms by beginning-of-year market value into size quartiles. Third, we match each 
firm with an industry-size peer group. Peer performance is the equal-weighted 
portfolio EPS for an industry-size peer group. When calculating portfolio EPS, we 
exclude the EPS of the observed firm. 
 
Reti,t = The firm’s stock returns over the 12-month period ending 3 months after fiscal year-
end t. 
 
Guidei,t+1 = Equals 1 if a firm issues management forecasts from the announcement of year t 
earnings to the approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Market Valuei,t = The firm’s market value of equity in millions at the end of fiscal year t. 
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Timeline of Analyst Forecasts 
 
 
This figure illustrates the timeline of analyst forecasts for year t+1 earnings issued from the announcement of year t 
earnings to the approval date of the annual bonus plan for year t+1. If the approval date is missing, we use the end 
date of the 3 months after the fiscal year-end as the approval date. If an analyst issues multiple forecasts during this 
period, we only use the most recent one. We average the analyst forecasts of year t+1 earnings to derive Analyst 





 Sample Selection 
 
S&P 1500 firm years from 2006 to 2014: 13,140 
Less firm years that do not use EPS as one of the performance measures  
for their executive annual bonus contracts: 
(9,837) 
S&P 1500 firm years that use EPS as a performance measure  
for executive annual bonus contracts: 3,303 
Less firm years that lack EPS target information for executive bonus contracts: (1,232) 
Sample firm years that have EPS target information: 2,071 
      Less firm years that lack analyst forecast information: (597) 
Sample firm years that have EPS target and analyst forecast information: 1,474 
      Less firm years that lack control variables (e.g., Growth, Relative-to-peers, and Ret): (206) 
Sample firm years that have EPS target and analyst forecast information, and control variables: 1,268 
Less firm years that lack two consecutive years of target data: (89) 
Final sample 1,179 
 







Measure N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev. 
Target EPSi,t+1−Target EPSi,t 1,179 0.202 0.215 -0.045 0.490 0.728 
Target revisioni,t+1 1,179 0.116 0.098 -0.022 0.228 0.355 
Actual EPSi,t−Target EPSi,t 1,179 0.039 0.060 -0.080 0.230 0.588 
Target deviationi,t 1,179 0.017 0.027 -0.040 0.111 0.318 
Analyst forecasti,t+1−Actual EPSi,t 1,179 0.164 0.162 -0.069 0.381 0.640 
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 1,179 0.110 0.075 -0.034 0.181 0.380 
Management forecasti,t+1−Actual EPSi,t 695 0.052 0.110 -0.150 0.270 0.638 
Management forecast devi,t+1 695 0.026 0.050 -0.068 0.114 0.300 
Market valuei,t 1,179 12,530 3,927 1,334 11,832 24,789 
ATi,t 1,179 16,629 4,306 1,383 12,371 39,695 
Relative-to-peersi,t 1,179 0.774 0.602 -0.324 1.629 1.824 
Ret i,t 1,179 0.092 0.127 -0.352 0.584 1.014 
Growthi,t+1 1,179 0.150 0.134 -0.085 0.333 0.371 
D_NEGi,t 1,179 0.348 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.476 
Guidei,t+1 1,179 0.589 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.492 
                
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables. The sample includes 1,179 firm-year observations 






 Target EPSi,t+1 
−Target EPSi,t 
(a) (b) (c) 
(a) Actual EPSi,t−Target EPSi,t 0.647 ***       
(b) Analyst forecast i,t+1−Actual EPSi,t  0.384 *** -0.186 ***     
(c) Management forecast i,t+1−Actual EPSi,t  0.308 *** -0.223 *** 0.779 ***   
(d) Growthi,t+1 0.070 *** 0.003  0.128 *** 0.061  
 
This table shows the correlations between the key variables. The sample includes 1,179 firm-year observations during 






Test of the Association between Analyst Forecasts and Target Revisions (H1) 
 
Target revisioni,t+1= λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t ×D_NEGi,t + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1  
   + λ4 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ5 Growth i,t+1 + λ6 D_NEGi,t + λ7 Ret i,t + λ8 Guide i,t+1 
           + Year and industry fixed effects +                                                                                 (1)  
 
                                                                     Dependent variable:                Target revisioni,t+1 
Independent variables: Pred. (1)  (2)  
Intercept  -0.023  0.013   
 (-0.93)  (0.68)  
Target deviationi,t  + 1.073 *** 0.982 ***  
 (15.53)  (15.69)  
Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  − -0.731 *** -0.355 ***  
 (-6.26)  (-2.82)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 +   0.376 ***  
   (5.45)  
Relative-to-peersi,t  − -0.019 *** -0.006   
 (-3.84)  (-1.59)  
Growthi,t+1  + 0.009  0.001   
 (1.08)  (0.00)  
D_NEGi,t ? -0.057 ** -0.038 * 
 
 (-2.45)  (-1.85)  
Reti,t  + 0.174 *** 0.101 ***  
 (4.95)  (3.43)  
Guidei,t+1 ? 0.018 
 0.014  
  (0.91)  (0.80)  
    
Year-fixed effects  Included Included 
Industry-fixed effects  Included Included 
Number of observations  1,179 1,179 
Adjusted R2   58.03% 69.68% 
 
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (1) using the OLS regression, where all t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on the standard errors clustered by firm. Appendix C provides the variable definitions. All of the variables 






 Effect of Incorporating Analyst Forecasts into Target Setting on Target Accuracy 
 
|Target deviationi,t+1|= λ0 + λ1 |Target deviationi,t |+                                                                                           (3)  
 
                                                                                    Dependent variable:               |Target deviationi,t+1| 
Independent variables: Pred.  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  0.096 *** 0.137 ***  
 (7.07)  (9.50)  
Target deviationi,t  + 0.559 *** 0.652 ***  
 (6.11)  (7.78)  
     
 
Number of observations  1,148 1,148 
R2   15.15% 16.62% 
Vuong’s (1989) Z-statistic  Z-statistic: 3.167 (p-value = 0.002) 
 
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (3). |Target deviationi,t| is the absolute value of (Actual EPSi,t − 
Target EPSi,t) divided by Target EPSi,t. In Column (1), we define |Target deviationi,t+1| as the absolute value of (Actual 
EPSi,t+1 − Target EPSi,t+1) divided by Target EPSi,t. In Column (2), we define |Target deviationi,t+1| as the absolute 
value of (Actual EPSi,t+1 − Predicted Target EPSi,t+1) divided by Target EPSi,t. Predicted Target EPSi,t+1 is estimated 
as the sum of Target EPSi,t and the predicted target revision for year t+1 is calculated using the following model: 
 
Target revisioni,t+1= λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t ×D_NEGi,t + λ3 Relative-to-peersi,t  
                           + λ4 Growth i,t+1 + λ5 D_NEGi,t + λ6 Ret i,t + λ7 Guide i,t+1 + Year and industry fixed effects +  
The Vuong (1989) test is a likelihood ratio-based test for model selection. The OLS regression is estimated, where all 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on the standard errors clustered by firm. Appendix C provides the variable 








Effects of the Informativeness of Analyst Forecasts on the Use of Analyst Forecasts in Target 
Setting (H2) 
 
Target revisioni,t+1 = λ 0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t ×D_NEGi,t + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1  
+ λ4 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast error quartilei,t  
+ λ5 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1  
+ λ6 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Analyst followingi,t+1 + λ7 Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Cyclicalityi,t  
+ λ8 Forecast error quartilei,t + λ9 Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1 + λ10 Analyst followingi,t  
+ λ11 Cyclicalityi,t + λ12 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ13 Growthi,t+1 + λ14 D_NEGi,t + λ15 Reti,t + λ16 Guidei,t+1 
+ Year and industry fixed effects +                                                                                              (4) 
                                                                                Dependent variable:                     Target revisioni,t+1 
Independent variables: Pred.  
Intercept  -0.061   
 (-0.99)  
Target deviationi,t  + 1.052 ***  
 (14.66)  
Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  − -0.554 ***  
 (-4.29)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 + 0.634 ***  
 (3.59)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast error quartilei,t − -0.071 ** 
  (-1.66)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1 − -0.215 *** 
  (-6.71)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Analyst followingi,t+1 + 0.101 ** 
  (1.71)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Cyclicalityi,t + 0.221 ** 
  (1.75)  
Forecast error quartilei,t ? 0.007  
  (0.95)  
Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1 ? 0.025 *** 
  (3.41)  
Analyst followingi,t+1 ? 0.002  
  (0.13)  
Cyclicalityi,t ? -0.010  
  (-0.50)  
Relative-to-peersi,t − -0.007 * 
  (-1.91)  




  (0.77)  
D_NEGi,t  ? -0.057 *** 
  (-2.62)  
Reti,t + 0.080 ** 
  (2.57)  
Guidei,t+1 ? 0.020  
  (1.07)  
   
Year-fixed effects  Included 
Industry-fixed effects  Included 
Number of observations  1,158 
Adjusted R2   66.07% 
 
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (4). The sample includes 1,158 firm-year observations during the 
2006 to 2014 period. The OLS regression is estimated, where all t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on the standard 
errors clustered by firm. Appendix C provides the variable definitions. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed for Analyst 
forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast error quartilei,t, Analyst forecast devi,t+1 × Forecast dispersion quartilei,t+1, Analyst 





Effects of Analyst Affiliation on the Association Between Analyst Forecasts and Target Revisions 
(H3)  
 
Target revisioni,t+1= λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t ×D_NEGi,t + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1  
             + λ4 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ5 Growth i,t+1 + λ6 D_NEGi,t + λ7 Ret i,t + λ8 Guide i,t+1  
             + Year and industry fixed effects +                                                                                     (1)  
 
Independent variables: Pred. 
(1)  
Analyst forecasts of 
affiliated analysts 
(2)  
Analyst forecasts of 
unaffiliated analysts 
Intercept  0.096  0.133   
 (0.77)  (1.06)  
Target deviationi,t  + 0.791 *** 0.802 ***  
 (2.80)  (2.99)  
Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  − -0.062  -0.012   
 (-0.22)  (-0.05)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 + 0.580 *** 0.620 ***  
 (6.16)  (5.92)  
Relative-to-peersi,t  − -0.040 *** -0.044 ***  
 (-3.04)  (-3.49)  
Growthi,t+1  + -0.023  -0.021   
 (-0.67)  (-0.64)  
D_NEGi,t ? -0.158 ** -0.149 ** 
 
 (-2.21)  (-2.10)  
Reti,t  + 0.078  0.055   
 (1.27)  (0.95)  
Guidei,t+1 ? -0.028 
 -0.012  
  (-0.45)  (-0.17)  
    
Chi-squared test: (1) λ3 = (2) λ3, 4.75 (p-value = 0.0293) 
Year-fixed effects  Included Included 
Industry-fixed effects  Included Included 
Number of observations  119 119 
Adjusted R2   80.82% 81.70% 
 
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (1) using the OLS regression, where all t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on the standard errors clustered by firm. An analyst is classified as an affiliated analyst if his or her brokerage 
firm was a lead or co-underwriter of the covered firm’s IPO and SEO over the previous 10 years (Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar 2014). Column (1) shows the test results using Analyst forecast devi,t+1 measured based on analyst 
forecasts issued by affiliated analysts. Column (2) shows the test results using Analyst forecast devi,t+1 measured based 
on analyst forecasts issued by unaffiliated analysts. Appendix C provides the variable definitions. All of the variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 





Additional Analyses I 
Panel A: Relative Importance of Analyst Forecasts Versus Management Forecasts in Target Setting 
 
Target revisioni,t+1 = λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1  
   + λ4 Management forecast devi,t+1 + λ5 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ6 Growthi,t+1 + λ7 D_NEGi,t  
   + λ8 Reti,t + Year and industry fixed effects +                                 (6)    
 
  Dependent variable:                 Target revisioni,t+1 
Independent variables: Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






















Target deviationi,t × 
D_NEGi,t  
− 











Analyst forecast devi,t+1 
 











Management forecast devi,t+1 + 0.284 *** -0.005    -0.054  -0.005  










Relative-to-peersi,t − -0.010 * -0.005  -0.010  -0.016  -0.004  










Growthi,t+1  + 0.004  -0.003  0.003  0.018  -0.003  










D_NEGi,t ? -0.021  -0.008  -0.104  -0.042  -0.005  










Reti,t  + 0.110 *** 0.053 ** 0.085  -0.103 * 0.057 ** 










       
Year-fixed effects  Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry-fixed effects  Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of observations  695 695 484 115 665 







TABLE 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlations Between Low (High) Bonus Targets and Walked-Down (Walked-Up) Analyst 
Forecasts  
 






High bonus targeti,t+1 -0.961 ***     
Walked-down analyst forecastsi,t+1 -0.033  0.025    
Walked-up analyst forecastsi,t+1 0.032  -0.026  -0.994 *** 
 
Panel A of this table reports the results of estimating Equation (6). Panel B reports the correlation matrix for the 
relation between low (high) bonus targets and walked-down (walked-up) analyst forecasts. In Columns (1) and (2) of 
Panel A, the regressions are estimated using a reduced sample of firms that issued management earnings forecasts. 
The results in Column (3) are based on a reduced sample of firms that did not issue management earnings forecasts. 
The results in Columns (4) and (5) are based on a sample of firms that issued management earnings forecasts, where 
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 in Column (4) is measured using analyst forecasts issued before management forecasts and 
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 in Column (5) is measured using analyst forecasts issued after management forecasts. The 
results in Panel A are based on the OLS regression, where all t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. The results in Panel B are based on individual analyst-level data. The sample for Panel B is 665 
observations at the firm-year-analyst level. Appendix C provides the variable definitions. All of the variables are 






Additional Analyses II 
Panel A: Alternative Growth Measures 
 
Target revisioni,t+1= λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t ×D_NEGi,t + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1  
   + λ4 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ5 Growth i,t+1 + λ6 D_NEGi,t + λ7 Ret i,t + λ8 Guide i,t+1 
           + Year and industry fixed effects +                                                                                  (1)  
Dependent variable:                  Target revisioni,t+1 






Independent variables: Pred. (1)  (2)  (3)  
Intercept  0.009  0.014  0.017   
 (0.47)  (0.69)  (0.72)  
Target deviationi,t  + 0.982 *** 0.982 *** 0.983 ***  
 (15.85)  (15.69)  (15.69)  
Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  − -0.357 *** -0.355 *** -0.357 ***  
 (-2.85)  (-2.82)  (-2.79)  
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 + 0.371 *** 0.376 *** 0.377 ***  
 (5.38)  (5.46)  (5.46)  
Relative-to-peersi,t  − -0.006  -0.006  -0.006   
 (-1.65)  (-1.58)  (-1.62)  
Growthi,t+1  + 0.145  -0.001  -0.009   
 (1.64)  (-0.11)  (-0.40)  
D_NEGi,t ? -0.039 * -0.038 * -0.039 * 
 
 (-1.89)  (-1.85)  (-1.88)  
Reti,t  + 0.091 *** 0.102 ** 0.103 **  
 (3.09)  (3.42)  (3.53)  
Guidei,t+1 ? 0.013  0.014  0.014  
  (0.76)  (0.80)  (0.81)  
     
Year-fixed effects  Included Included Included 
Industry-fixed effects  Included Included Included 
Number of observations  1,179 1,179 1,176 






TABLE 9 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Alternative Measure for Peer Performance 
 
Target revisioni,t+1= λ0 + λ1 Target deviationi,t + λ2 Target deviationi,t ×D_NEGi,t + λ3 Analyst forecast devi,t+1  
             + λ4 Relative-to-peersi,t + λ5 Growth i,t+1 + λ6 D_NEGi,t + λ7 Ret i,t + λ8 Guide i,t+1  
             + Year and industry fixed effects +                                                                                     (1)  
 Dependent variable:                  Target revisioni,t+1 
Independent variables: Pred. (1) 
Intercept  0.024   
 (0.51) 
 
Target deviationi,t  + 0.985 ***  
 (14.35) 
 
Target deviationi,t × D_NEGi,t  − -0.368 ***  
 (-2.48) 
 
Analyst forecast devi,t+1 + 0.322 ***  
 (4.46) 
 
Relative-to-peersi,t − -0.001  
  (-0.27) 
 
Growthi,t+1 + -0.004  
  (-0.49) 
 
D_NEGi,t  ? -0.041 * 
  (-1.86) 
 
Reti,t + 0.109 *** 
  (3.32) 
 
Guidei,t+1 ? 0.017  
  (0.89) 
 
   
Year-fixed effects  Included 
Industry-fixed effects  Included 
Number of observations  1,028 
Adjusted R2   67.00% 
 
Panel A of this table reports the estimation results of Equation (1) using alternative measures of Growthi,t+1. We replace 
the dependent variable in Equation (2) with alternative growth proxies, such as growth in sales, income before 
extraordinary items, and operating income before depreciation. Panel B reports the results of estimating Equation (1) 
using the alternative method of identifying industry peers following Jayaraman et al. (2015) and Hoberg and Phillips 
(2016). The OLS regression is estimated, where all t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on the standard errors 
clustered by firm. Appendix C provides the variable definitions. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
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